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Abstract—We propose that by integrating behavioural bio-
metric gestures—such as drawing figures on a touch screen—
with challenge-response based cognitive authentication schemes,
we can benefit from the properties of both. On the one hand,
we can improve the usability of existing cognitive schemes by
significantly reducing the number of challenge-response rounds
by (partially) relying on the hardness of mimicking carefully
designed behavioural biometric gestures. On the other hand, the
observation resistant property of cognitive schemes provides an
extra layer of protection for behavioural biometrics; an attacker
is unsure if a failed impersonation is due to a biometric failure
or a wrong response to the challenge. We design and develop an
instantiation of such a “hybrid” scheme, and call it BehavioCog.
To provide security close to a 4-digit PIN—one in 10,000 chance
to impersonate—we only need two challenge-response rounds,
which can be completed in less than 38 seconds on average (as
estimated in our user study), with the advantage that unlike PINs
or passwords, the scheme is secure under observation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Eurocrypt 1991 [38], Matsumoto and Imai raised an
intriguing question: Is it possible to authenticate a user when
someone is observing the authentication process? It is easy
to see that passwords, PINs or graphical patterns are not
secure under this threat model, as the observer can readily
impersonate the user after observing one authentication ses-
sion. Consider for a moment the benefits if an observation
resistant authentication scheme existed. We could unlock our
smartphones in front of others, authenticate to an ATM with a
queue of people behind us, and log on to internet banking in a
crowded subway, all without worrying about our authentication
credentials being stolen. Unfortunately, more than two decades
and a half later, this still remains an open problem. Most
proposed solutions to this problem are a form of shared-
secret challenge-response type authentication protocols relying
on human cognitive abilities, variously called human identifi-
cation protocols [23], cognitive authentication schemes [52]
or leakage-resilient password systems [54]. We will use the
term cognitive schemes to refer to them. The idea of using
cognitive schemes in part originates from the cryptographic
notion of identification protocols, but one where the role of
the prover is performed by the human user, and therefore some
computations in the protocol have to be done mentally by the
user. This requirement imposes a design constraint: to make the
*This is the full version of the paper with the same title which appears
in the proceedings of the twenty-first international conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security 2017 (FC ’17).
system usable the cognitive load due to mental computations
should be minimized.
This not only means that only elementary computations
should be used, but also that the size of the challenges should
be small. But by far the most crippling design constraint is
that the response space cannot be too large. If R denotes
the response space, and |R| its size, then |R| typically ranges
between 2 and 10 [23], [31], [52], [6]. Observe that anyone
can guess the response to a challenge with probability |R|−1,
even without knowing the secret. Consequently, the number
of challenges (or rounds) per authentication session needs
to be increased, which in turn increases the authentication
time. Let us illustrate this with some examples. To achieve a
security equivalent to (guessing) a six digit PIN, i.e., 10−6, the
(low complexity) cognitive scheme (CAS) proposed by Wein-
shall [52] requires 11 rounds with a total authentication time
of 120 seconds, the HB protocol from Hopper and Blum [23]
requires 20 rounds and 660 seconds to authenticate [54],
and the Foxtail protocol from Li and Shum [31] requires
20 rounds with a cumulative time of 212 seconds [54]. An
authentication time between 10 to 30 seconds per round is
perhaps acceptable, since cognitive schemes provide strong
security under observation. Thus, if we could significantly
reduce the number of rounds, there is a case to use cognitive
authentication schemes.
Our idea is to seek help from gesture-based behavioural
biometrics by coupling them with the response space of
cognitive schemes. More specifically, we (publicly) map the
response space R to a set of |R| different gesture-based
symbols (such as words or figures) rendered by the user, say, on
the touch screen of a smartphone. A classifier decides whether
these symbols belong to the target user. We could tune the
classifier to achieve a true positive rate (TPR) close to 1,
while giving it some leverage in the false positive rate (FPR),
say 0.10. We can now see how we can reduce the number
of rounds of the cognitive scheme. Suppose |R| = 4 in the
cognitive scheme, such as CAS [52]. If we map each of the
four responses to four different symbols with an average FPR
of 0.10, then the probability of randomly guessing the response
to a challenge can be estimated as FPR×|R|−1 = 0.025. Thus,
only 4 rounds instead of 11 will make the guess probability
lower than the security of a 6-digit PIN; an improvement
of more than half even with a fairly high FPR. The idea
also prevents a possible attack on standalone behavioural
biometric based authentication. Minus the cognitive scheme,
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an imposter can use the behavioural biometric system as an
“oracle” by continuously adapting its mimicking of the target
user’s gestures until it succeeds. Integrated with a cognitive
scheme, the imposter is unsure whether a failed attempt is due
to a biometric error or a cognitive error, or both. The benefit
appears mutual.
Combining the two authentication approaches into a “hy-
brid” scheme is not as simple as it sounds. First, in order to
preserve the observation resistance property, the behavioural
biometric symbols should be hard to mimic even after an
observer has seen users render the symbols on the screen.
Behavioural biometric authentication schemes using simple
gestures, such as swipes, have been shown to be susceptible
to mimicry attacks [27]. Other schemes that employ more
complex gestures [39], [45], such as free-hand drawings, only
tackle shoulder-surfing as opposed to an adversary which has
unrestricted access to video transcripts (see Section VIII). Sec-
ond, the cognitive scheme CAS [52] used for illustration above
is shown to be insecure [20]. Other proposed schemes from
literature also lack both the security and usability attributes
we desire from a suitable candidate, such as resistance to
known attacks, suitability to devices with small displays and
low cognitive load in computing responses to challenges (see
Section VIII).
This leads to the other main contributions of our work:
– We propose a new gesture based behavioural biometric
scheme that employs a set of words constructed from
certain letters from the English alphabet (e.g., b,f,g,x,m).
Previous results from the field of psychology suggest that
these letters when written cursively are harder to write
in terms of writing pressure and time [26], [50]. We
hypothesized that being harder to write, words constructed
from these letters would show more inter-user variation
while simultaneously being hard to mimic. Our results
indicate that such words are indeed harder to mimic than
other words and figures (drawings). The average FPR of
these words was 0.0 against random attacks and even
after video based observation attacks it went up to only
0.05. Our proposed behavioural biometric scheme is by
itself a contribution, and can be further explored to see its
potential as a standalone system secure under observation.
– We propose a new cognitive authentication scheme in-
spired from the HB protocol [23] and the Foxtail pro-
tocol [31], [2]. The scheme was designed to balance
usability and resistance to known attacks on cognitive
authentication schemes. We provide a thorough secu-
rity analysis of the scheme and suggest parameter sizes
against adversarial resources such as time, memory and
number of observations. The scheme can be thought of
as a contrived version of learning with noisy samples,
where the noise is partially a function of the challenge.
The generalized form of the resulting scheme is conjec-
tured to resist around |R| × n number of rounds against
computationally efficient attacks, where n is the size of
the problem.
– We combine the above two into a hybrid authentication
scheme which we call BehavioCog and implement it as an
app for Android powered smartphones. The app is config-
urable; parameter sizes of both the cognitive (challenge
size, secret size, response space, etc.) and behavioural
biometric (symbols, amount of training, etc.) components
can be tuned at set up. The app partially guided setting
parameter sizes for the BehavioCog scheme, such as
the size of challenges and length/size of symbols, based
on what was viewable and writeable on the smartphone
touch screen. Our cognitive scheme is implemented using
a set of emojis (a set of “smileys” used for digital
communication). However, emojis can be replaced by any
other set of images or characters.
– We carry out a user study with 41 different users and
do an extensive analysis of the usability, security and
repeatability of our scheme. We video recorded the au-
thentication sessions to simulate a hidden camera and
allowed users to act as attackers by impersonating a
target user providing them with video transcripts and
unrestricted control over the playback. None of the attacks
were successful in our scheme (with two rounds in one
authentication session). Our results also give separate
statistics, such as authentication time and errors, for the
cognitive and biometric components. Results indicate that
the time taken to compute the cognitive challenge can
be as low as 12 seconds (on average) and 6 seconds
(on average) to submit the response through a biometric
symbol.
In terms of overall results, we find that the average authen-
tication time for each round could go as low as 19 seconds and
we can achieve security comparable to a 4-digit PIN within just
2 rounds, and close to 6-digit PIN with 3 rounds, even under
observation attacks. The error rate was relatively high for the
cognitive scheme with the best case being 15%.1 However,
the study was intentionally carried out with a high number of
pass-emojis (cognitive secret), 14 to be precise, since smaller
sized graphical passwords (say 3 to 5) have already been
demonstrated to be recognizable [17], [22]. Moreover, our
scheme also allows smaller sizes of pass-emojis with a trade
off that a lower number of observations can be resisted.
We do not claim that our idea completely solves the
problem raised by Matsumoto and Imai, but believe it to be a
step forward towards that goal.2 In addition, we believe that our
proposal can potentially revive interest in research on cognitive
authentication schemes and their application as a separate fac-
tor in multi-factor authentication schemes. We have organized
the rest of the paper as follows. Section II contains overview
of the BehavioCog scheme and the threat model followed by
the description of the cognitive scheme in Section III and the
behavioural biometric scheme in Section IV. Implementation
details are given in Section V. Sections VI and VII detail
the user study and its results, respectively. Related work is
summarized in Section VIII. We discuss some limitations and
identify areas of future research in Section IX and conclude
the paper with Section X.
II. OVERVIEW OF BEHAVIOCOG
We begin with defining authentication schemes and the ad-
versarial model, followed by the overview of our BehavioCog
scheme.
1In fact, we show that by carefully designing the training module we can
reduce the error to 14% even after a gap of a week. See Section VII-C
2Also see our discussion in Section IX.
2
A. Preliminaries
1) Authentication Schemes: An authentication scheme con-
sists of two protocols: registration and authentication, between
two parties: the prover and the verifier [42]. In this paper, we
assume the prover to be a user U , and the verifier to be an
authentication service S. A shared-secret challenge-response
authentication scheme is an authentication scheme in which
U and S share a secret x from a secret space X during
registration, and the authentication phase is as follows: Here,
1 for γ rounds do
2 S sends a challenge c ∈ C to U .
3 U sends the response r = f(x, c) to S.
4 if all γ responses are correct S accepts U , else it rejects
U .
C is the challenge space, and r belongs to a response space
R. The function f : X × C → R is what we shall refer to
as a cognitive function in this paper. Note that apart from the
selected secret x ∈ X , everything else is public. Since x is
shared, S can compute f itself to check if the responses are
correct. A challenge and a response from the same round shall
be referred to as a challenge-response pair. An authentication
session, therefore, consists of γ challenge-response pairs as
above. In practice, we assume U and S interact via the user’s
device (e.g., a smartphone) and the function f needs to be
computed mentally by U .
2) Adversarial Model: We assume a passive adversary A
who can observe one or more authentication sessions between
U and S. In other words, A can see challenge-response pairs
exchanged between the two parties. The goal of A is to
impersonate U by initiating a new session with S and making it
acceptA as U .A can succeed in doing so either by learning the
secret x or by correctly guessing γ responses. The probability
of the latter approach is |R|−γ . Thus, γ can be set such that
this quantity is below the desired security level. In practice, we
assume that A can observe the screen of the device used by U
(on which the challenges are displayed and the responses are
entered). This can be done either via shoulder-surfing (simply
by looking over U’s shoulder) or via a video recording using a
spy camera. Clearly, the latter attack is more powerful, and a
system secure under this attack is arguably also secure against
direct shoulder-surfing. We assume that U’s device is secure.3
B. The BehavioCog Scheme
The main idea of our hybrid authentication scheme is as
follows. Instead of sending the response r to a challenge c from
S, U renders a symbol corresponding to r, and this rendered
symbol is then sent to S. In practice, this is implemented as U
rendering the symbol on the touch screen of the user’s device.
More specifically, we assume a set of symbols denoted Ω,
e.g., a set of words in English,4 where the number of symbols
equals the number of responses |R|. Each response r ∈ R
is mapped to a symbol in Ω. The symbol corresponding to r
shall be represented by sym(r). Upon receiving the rendering
3The original threat model from Matsumoto and Imai also assumes that the
device as well as the communication channel between the device and S are
insecure. Our threat model is slightly restricted.
4For a word, rendering means writing.
of sym(r), S first checks if the rendered symbol “matches”
a previously stored rendering from U and then checks if the
response r is correct by computing f . If the answer to both
is yes in each challenge-response round, S accepts the user.
Two observations are in order. First, the registration phase
now needs to collect sample renderings for each symbol in Ω,
which we refer to as templates. Second, in order to compare a
rendering against the stored templates we need a classifier D
that can decide if it matches any of the |Ω| templates or not.
The scheme is described via a series of protocols described
in Figure 1. To explain the protocols, we begin by detailing the
cognitive scheme first. Assume a global pool of n objects (e.g.,
images or emojis). A secret x ∈ X is a k-element subset of the
global pool of objects. Thus, |X| = (nk). Each object of x is
called a pass-object, and the remaining n−k objects are called
decoys. The challenge space C consists of pairs c = (a,w),
where a is an l-element sequence of objects from the global
pool, and w is an l-element sequence of integers from Zd,
where d ≥ 2. Members of w shall be called weights. The ith
weight in w is denoted wi and corresponds to the ith element
of a, i.e., ai. The notation c ∈U C, which means sampling
a random l-element sequence of objects a and a random l-
element sequence of weights w. The cognitive function f is
defined as
f(x, c) =
{∑
i|ai∈x wi mod d, if x ∩ a 6= ∅
r ∈U Zd, if x ∩ a = ∅. (1)
That is, sum all the weights of the pass-objects in c and return
the answer modulo d. If no pass-object is present then return
a random element from Zd. The notation ∈U means sampling
uniformly at random. It follows that the response space R =
Zd and |R| = d. Now, let Ω be a set of d symbols. Later on,
we shall show different instantiations of Ω. For now, we can
consider Ω to be the set of English words of integers in Zd,
i.e., zero, one, two, and so on. The mapping sym : Zd → Ω
is the straightforward lexicographic mapping. Note that we do
not require this mapping to be a secret. We assume a (d+ 1)-
classifier D which when given as input the templates of all
symbols in Ω, and a rendering of some symbol purported to be
from Ω, outputs the corresponding symbol in Ω if the rendering
matches any of the symbol templates. If no match is found,
D outputs “none.” D needs a certain number of renderings of
each symbol to build its templates. We denote this number by t.
For instance, t = 3, 5 or 10. Note that since S rejects whenever
a rendering does not match the template, we need to tune D
to have a near 100 percent TPR to avoid errors. The specific
classifier we use is based on the dynamic time warping (DTW)
algorithm [28], [35]. We postpone the details of the classifier
till Section IV. Figure 1 describes the above process concisely
via protocols for set up, registration and authentication.
Since the set up and registration protocols are straightfor-
ward, we only briefly describe the authentication protocol here.
S initializes an error flag to 0 (Step 1). Then, for each of the γ
rounds, S sends c = (a,w) ∈U C to U (Step 3). U computes
f according to Eq. 1, and obtains the response r (Step 4). U
gets the symbol to be rendered through sym(r), and sends a
rendering of the symbol to S (Step 5). Now, S runs the trained
classifier D on the rendered symbol (Step 6). If the classifier
outputs “none,” S sets the error flag to 1 (Step 8). Otherwise,
D outputs the symbol corresponding to the rendering. Through
3
1: Setup.
1 S publishes parameters n, k, l and d
(e.g., n = 180, k = 14, l = 30,
d = 5).
2 S publishes the global pool of n objects
(e.g., emojis).
3 S publishes a set of d symbols Ω (e.g.,
words).
4 S publishes the map sym from Zd to Ω.
5 S publishes the (untrained) classifier D.
6 S publishes t, the required number of
renderings per symbol to create
templates (e.g., t = 10).
2: Registration.
1 U and S share a secret x ∈ X .
2 For each symbol in Ω, U sends t
renderings to S.
3 For each symbol in Ω, S trains
D on the t renderings to obtain
U ’s template.
4 The secret consists of x and the
d templates.
3: Authentication.
1 S sets err = 0.
2 for γ rounds do
3 S samples c = (a,w) ∈U C and sends it to U .
4 U computes r = f(x, c).
5 U renders the symbol sym(r), and sends it to S.
6 S runs D on the rendering.
7 if D outputs “none” then
8 S sets err = 1.
9 else
10 S obtains r corresponding to the symbol output by D.
11 if x ∩ a 6= ∅ and r 6= f(x, c) then
12 S sets err = 1.
13 If err = 1, S rejects U ; otherwise it accepts U .
Fig. 1: The setup, registration and authentication protocols of BehavioCog.
the inverse map, S gets the response r corresponding to the
symbol (Step 10). Now, if x ∩ a = ∅, i.e., none of the pass-
objects are in the challenge, then any response r ∈ Zd is
valid, and therefore S moves to the next round. Otherwise, if
x∩a 6= ∅, S further checks if r is indeed the correct response
by computing f (Step 11). If it is incorrect, S sets the error
flag to 1 (Step 12). Otherwise, if the response is correct, S
moves to the next round. If after the end of γ rounds, the
error flag is 0, then S accepts U , otherwise it rejects U (Step
13).
III. THE COGNITIVE SCHEME
Our proposed cognitive scheme can be thought of as an
amalgamation of the HB scheme based on the learning parity
with noise (LPN) problem [23], and the Foxtail scheme (with
window) [31], [2]. More specifically, we use the idea of using
an l-element challenge from the Foxtail with window scheme.
However instead of using the Foxtail function, which maps
the sum of integers modulo d = 4, to 0 if the sum is in
{0, 1}, and 1 otherwise, we output the sum itself as the answer.
The reason for that is to reduce the number of rounds, i.e.,
γ, for a required security level (the success probability of
random guess is 12 in one round of the Foxtail scheme). Now
if we allow the user to output 0 in case none of its pass-
objects are present in a challenge, the probability distribution
of the output of f is skewed towards 0, which makes the
scheme susceptible to a statistical attack proposed by Yan
et al. [54] outlined in Section III-D. In order to circumvent
this, we ask the user to output a random response from Zd
whenever none of the pass-objects are present. This fix makes
the scheme immune to the statistical attack. We shall provide
more details in Section III-D. Due to the random response, we
can say that the resulting scheme adds noise to the samples
(challenge-response pairs) collected by A, somewhat similar
in spirit to HB. The difference is that in our case, the noise
is (partially) a function of the challenge, whereas in HB the
noise is independently generated with a fixed probability and
added to the sum. Having laid out the main idea behind the
cognitive scheme, we now discuss its security in detail.
A. Random Guess Attack
In principle, two kinds of random guess attacks are pos-
sible: randomly guessing the secret and then computing the
response according to f , or randomly guessing the response.
The success probability of the first form is proportional to(
n
k
)−1
, which is negligible if n and k are moderately large.
We therefore only consider the second form of random guess.
Let pRG denote the success probability of a random guess. This
probability is conditioned on the event a ∩ x being empty or
not. Since this event shall be frequently referred to in the text,
we give it a special name: the empty case. Now the probability
that i pass-objects are present in a, is given by the probability
mass function of the hypergeometric distribution
P [|a ∩ x| = i] =
(
k
i
)(
n−k
l−i
)(
n
l
) ,
from which it follows that
P [|a ∩ x| = 0] .= p0 =
(
n−k
l
)(
n
l
) .
We shall use the notation .= when defining a variable. Thus,
pRG = p0 + (1− p0)1
d
.
B. Brute Force Attack and Information Theoretic Bound
This attack is only possible after A has observed m > 0
challenge-response pairs (or samples) corresponding to suc-
cessful authentication sessions. Before observing any samples,
i.e., m = 0, all possible
(
n
k
)
subsets are possible candidates of
the target secret x. We denote a candidate by y, where quite
possibly y = x. After observing one sample, the probability
that a y ∈ X is still a candidate for the secret x is given by
p0 + (1− p0)1
d
,
which is the same as the probability of a successful random
guess. This follows because if a∩y = ∅, i.e., if it is the empty
case, then y is trivially consistent with any response. On the
other hand, if a∩ y 6= ∅, then the probability that the response
from y matches that of x is 1d . Thus, we expect(
p0 + (1− p0)1
d
)m(
n
k
)
,
subsets in X to still remain as candidates for x after observing
m challenge-response pairs. Equating the above to 1, gives us
m
.
= mit = −
log2
(
n
k
)
log2(p0 + (1− p0) 1d )
.
4
We call mit, the information theoretic bound on m. This is the
least (expected) number of samples needed to be observed to
obtain a unique candidate for the secret.
C. Meet-in-the-Middle Attack
This attack [23] works by first computing k2 -sized subsets
of X on each of the m observed challenge-response pairs, and
storing the m-element response string together with the subset
in a hash table. After that, for each possible “intermediate”
response string in Zmd , and for each
k
2 -sized subsets of X
we compute the final response string of m-elements. If this
response string matches at least m(1 − p0) responses5 in the
response string of the target secret x, we insert the intermediate
response string together with the corresponding k2 -sized subset
in the same hash table. Any collision in the hash table marks
a possible candidate for x (by combining the two k2 -sized
subsets). In a post-processing step, we can check whether a
candidate y is consistent by checking if the mp0 fraction of
incorrect responses correspond to the empty case. The time
and space complexity of this attack is
(
n
k/2
)
. We note that
there is another meet-in-the-middle attack shown in [6] based
on Coppersmith’s baby-step giant-step algorithm [47], of time
complexity
(
n/2
k/2
)
, but with the same space complexity of
(
n
k/2
)
.
D. Frequency Analysis
Frequency analysis is an attack proposed by Yan et al. [54]6
which could be done either independently or dependent on the
response. In response-independent frequency analysis (RIFA),
a frequency table of δ-tuples of objects is created, where
1 ≤ δ ≤ k. If a δ-tuple is present in a challenge, its fre-
quency is incremented by 1. After gathering enough challenge-
response pairs, the tuples with the highest or lowest fre-
quencies may contain the k secret objects if the challenges
are constructed with a skewed distribution. In the response-
dependent frequency analysis (RDFA), the frequency table
contains frequencies for each possible response in Zd, and
the frequency of a δ-tuple is incremented by 1 in the column
corresponding to the response (if present in the challenge).
First, note that our cognitive scheme is resistant to RIFA
since the challenges are drawn uniformly at random without
considering pass or decoy objects. This follows from Lemma
17 in [5]. To see that RDFA is also not applicable, define the
indicator random variable
I(x′) =
{
1, if each element of x′ is in a
0, otherwise,
where x′ ⊆ x ∈ X . We define a similar indicator random
variable I(y′) for y′ ⊆ y ∈ Xn−k, where Xn−k denotes the
set of n− k decoy objects. Now for RDFA to be inapplicable
we should have
P [I(x′) = b | r = i] = P [I(y′) = b | r = i] ,
for i ∈ Zd, b ∈ {0, 1} and |x′| = |y′|. Using Baye’s rule
P [I(x′) = b | r = i] = P [r = i | I(x
′) = b]P [I(x′) = b]
P [r = i]
.
5i.e., the expected number of samples that do not belong to the empty case.
6We borrow the term frequency analysis from [5].
Now,
P [r = i] = p0 · 1
d
+ (1− p0)1
d
=
1
d
.
Also, from Lemma 17 in [5]
P [I(x′) = 1] = P [I(y′) = 1] =
(
n−δ
l−δ
)(
n
l
) ,
where δ .= |x′| = |y′|. From the above, it follows that
P [I(x′) = 0] = P [I(y′) = 0]. Now,
P [r = i | I(y′) = b] = P [r = i] = 1
d
,
since the responses are not dependent on the decoy objects.
Finally, we see that
P [r = i | I(x′) = 1] = 1
d
,
since at least δ pass-objects are present in the challenge, and
the response is the sum modulo d, which due to the randomness
of weights is distributed uniformly in Zd. If I(x′) = 0, there
are two possibilities. Either δ−1 or less number of pass-objects
are present in the challenge, in which case the response is
again uniform in Zd, or none of the pass-objects are present
(empty case). But in the latter case, we ask the user to output a
random response in Zd. Therefore, the probability of observing
a response r = i is 1d . From this it follows that our scheme is
secure against RDFA.
E. Coskun and Herley Attack
Since only l objects are present in each challenge, the
number of pass-objects present is also less than k with high
probability. Let u denote the average number of bits of x
used in responding to a challenge. The Coskun and Herley
(CH) attack [15] states that if u is small, then candidates
y ∈ X, y 6= x, that are close to x in terms of some distance
metric, will output similar responses to x. If we sample a large
enough subset from X , then with high probability there is a
candidate for x that is a distance ξ from x. We can remove
all those candidates whose responses are far away from the
observed responses, and then iteratively move closer to x. The
running time of the CH attack is at least |X|/(log2 |X|ξ ) [15]
where |X| = (nk), with the trade off that m ≈ 12 samples are
needed for the attack to output x with high probability [3], [8].
The parameter  is the difference in probabilities that distance
ξ+ 1 and ξ−1 candidates have the same response as x. More
specifically  is given by [3]

.
=
((
log2 |X|−ξ+1
υ
)(
log2 |X|
υ
) − (log2 |X|−ξ−1υ )(
log2 |X|
υ
) )(1− 1
d
)
,
where υ is the average number of bits of the secret used
per challenge, and can be estimated as ln log2 |X| [3]. As we
choose higher values of ξ, the complexity of the attack de-
creases but the probability differences become less prominent,
which in turn means that more samples m need to be observed.
The optimal value of ξ is when the time complexity is below
a threshold, giving us a value of  from which the number of
required samples m can be obtained [3].
5
F. Linearization
We begin by assigning an order to the n objects in the
global pool. We can then represent the secret x as an n-
element binary vector x of Hamming weight k (where xi = 1
indicates that object i is present in the secret). Similarly, a
challenge c = (a,w) can be represented by the n-element
binary vector a of Hamming weight l (indicating the presence
of the corresponding object) and the n-element vector w of
Hamming weight ≤ l, where wi = 0 if ai = 0. Let η ∈U Zd.
Then our cognitive function f can be rewritten as
f(x, c) = bw · x+ η(1− b) mod d, (2)
where b = sgn(a · x) is the sign function. Now, consider the
case r .= f(x, c) = 0. This is possible if b = 1 and w · x ≡
0 mod d, or when b = 0 and η = 0. In the latter case, note
that w ·x = 0 (even without the modulus), and hence trivially
w · x ≡ 0 mod d. On the other hand, if r 6= 0, we again have
the possibility that if b = 1, w ·x ≡ r mod d or if b = 0, then
η = r. However, we cannot write the latter as an equation in
x and w without including the non-zero noise term η.
Thus one attack strategy is to keep samples corresponding
to a 0 response to build a system of linear congruences.
After n such congruences have been obtained, A can use
Gaussian elimination to obtain a unique solution for x, thus
obtaining the secret. That is, create the matrix W whose ith
row corresponds to the weight vector from the ith challenge
ci such that the corresponding response is 0. This gives us the
system of linear congruences Wx ≡ 0 mod d, where W is an
n × n square matrix. Of course, W needs to be a full rank
matrix. This can be done by observing a little over n samples
(with 0 response), because with high probability a randomly
generated W is of full rank if l is large enough [3], [34].
For instance, with (k, l, n) = (14, 30, 140) we found that a
fraction 0.29 of the matrices generated had full rank by running
a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 repetitions. Note that
since the response is uniformly distributed in Zd, we expect
to construct W after observing dn challenge-response pairs.
Thus, we are discarding all challenges that correspond to a
non-zero response.
Another way of linearization that does not discard any
challenges, but requires the observations of the same number
of challenge-response pairs, is to introduce (d−1)n new binary
variables. We illustrate this using d = 2 as an example. Let
wi denote the ith n-element weight vector. Then we can form
the system
w1 1 0 · · · 0
w2 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
wn 0 0 · · · 1
wn+1 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
w2n 0 0 · · · 0


x1
...
xn
xn+1
...
x2n

≡

1
...
1
0
...
0

mod 2,
where xn+1, . . . , x2n are n new variables. The above system
of equations is obtained by observing 2n challenge-response
pairs and re-arranging the 0 and 1 responses (the top n rows
correspond to r = 1). Let us call the 2n× 2n matrix, W . By
construction of the last n columns of W , the 2n rows of W are
linearly independent regardless of the vectors w1, . . . ,wn as
long as the vectors wn+1, . . . ,wn remain linearly independent.
But we have seen above that this is true with high probability.
Hence, we can use Gaussian elimination again to uniquely
obtain the secret. To see that the above system is consistent
with observation, consider the first row. If it corresponds
to the empty case, then by setting xn+1 = 1 we get the
response 1. On the other hand, if it is not the zero case then
xn+1 = 0 satisfies the equation. Any of the two values of xn+1
satisfy the 0-response rows. Since the responses are generated
randomly, we expect to obtain the above system by observing
dn challenge-response pairs. Note that if U were to respond
with 0 in the empty case, then we could obtain a linear system
of equations after n challenge-response pairs. The introduction
of noise expands the number of required challenge-response
pairs to dn, an increase by a factor of d. Gaussian elimination
is by far the most efficient attack on our scheme, and therefore
this constitutes a significant gain.
G. Generalization
With the exception of Gaussian elimination, all other
attacks mentioned above have complexity exponential in one
or more variables in (k, l, n). Since the above linearization
works after observing dn challenge-response pairs, we believe
the problem of finding a polynomial time algorithm in (k, l, n)
which uses m < dn number of samples (say (d−1)n samples)
from the function described in Eq. 1 is an interesting open
question.
H. Example Parameter Sizes
Table I shows an example list of parameter sizes for the
cognitive scheme. These sizes are obtained by fixing d = 5 and
changing k, l and n such that the random guess probability pRG
is approximately 0.25. We suggest d = 5 as a balance between
reducing the number of rounds required, i.e., γ, and ease of
computing f . The column labelled mit is the information theo-
retic bound on minimum (expected) number of samples needed
to uniquely obtain the secret. Thus, the first two suggestions
are only secure with ≤ mit observed samples. The complexity
shown for both the meet-in-the-middle attack (MitM) and
Coskun and Herley (CH) attack represents time as well as
space complexity. The last column is Gaussian elimination
(GE). The required number of samples for GE is calculated
as dn. For other attacks, we show the minimum number of
required samples m, such that m ≥ mit and the complexity
is as reported. We can think of the last two suggested sizes
as secure against an adversary with time/memory resources
≈ 270/240 (medium strength) and ≈ 280/250 (high strength),
respectively.
TABLE I: Example parameter sizes for the cognitive scheme.
(d, k, l, n) mit pRG BF MitM CH GE
(5, 5, 24, 60) 11 0.255 222 212 211 poly(n)
Samples required - 0 11 11 23 300
(5, 10, 30, 130) 24 0.252 248 228 233 poly(n)
Samples required - 0 24 24 24 650
(5, 14, 30, 180) 34 0.256 268 240 240 poly(n)
Samples required - 0 34 34 94 900
(5, 18, 30, 225) 44 0.254 287 251 251 poly(n)
Samples required - 0 44 44 168 1125
6
IV. THE BEHAVIOURAL BIOMETRIC SCHEME
Our behavioural biometric authentication scheme is based
on touch gestures with the assumption that a user exhibits
similar behaviour when interacting with the touch screens
of devices (such as smartphones, tablets and laptops) while
remaining different from other users [19], [29]. In our scheme,
we gather user touch gestures via a set of symbols Ω. As
mentioned before, the (d+1)-classifier D when given as input
the template of a target user U , should be able to decide two
things: (a) whether the rendering of a symbol corresponds to
a symbol in Ω or not, (b) whether the symbol matches the
symbol template of U . For each symbol in Ω, the true positive
rate (TPR) of D is defined as the rate at which it correctly
matches U’s renderings of the symbol to U’s template for that
symbol. Similarly, the false positive rate (FPR) of D is the
rate at which it erroneously decides that A’s rendering of the
symbol matches U’s template. The accuracy of D for a symbol
in Ω is defined as 12 (TPR+1−FPR). High accuracy therefore
corresponds to high TPR and low FPR. For our purpose, we
set TPR of D close to 1.0 for each symbol, and try to minimize
the FPR.
A. Choice of Symbols
Previous research on gesture-based biometric authentica-
tion on touch screen devices indicate that the swipe gesture
has good distinguishing characteristics [19], [29]. However,
to obtain good accuracy, a large number of swipes need to be
gathered [29], [14]. Our first criterion for designing symbols is
that they should be rich enough as to simulate multiple swipes.
The second property we require is that the symbol should be
hard for A to mimic even after observing U render the symbol.
The third consideration is that the symbol should be easily
repeatable by U even when there is a gap between successive
authentications. Finally, the symbols should be distinct from
each other so that the classifier D can easily distinguish
between d different symbols. With these properties in mind,
we chose four different sets of symbols: easy words, complex
words, easy figures and complex figures, shown in Table II
together with the mapping to elements of Z5. Some details
follow:
– easy words: This set corresponds to English words for the
numbers, and serves as a base case since the mapping is
straightforward. However, these words can potentially be
prone to mimicking.
– complex words: Previous research shows that some let-
ters in the English alphabet are more difficult to write
cursively than others because they contain more number
of turns [26], [50]. The letters b, f, g, h, k, m, n, q, t, u,
w, x, y, and z provide more turns than others [26]. Our
hypothesis was that if these letters are difficult to write,
they might show more variation across users and also be
difficult to mimic. Our user study shows the plausibility of
our hypothesis, as complex words were the most resilient
among all symbol sets against observation attacks.
We constructed five words from these 14 letters with at
most one letter from the 14 in all words. The length of
the words was fixed at four, since it was found through
our implementation on a smartphone (see Section V) that
words with more than 4 letters were difficult for users to
write on the touch screen. As it is difficult to construct
meaningful words without vowels, we allowed one vowel
to be present in each word. For both sets of words, we did
not use capital letters as they show less variation among
users [9].
– easy figures: This set contains numbers written in black-
board bold shape. We chose blackboard bold style to
allow for more richness in the symbol. Another property
of these figures is that the user can render them by starting
at the top left most point and draw them without lifting
the finger by traversing in a down and right manner.
This removes a drawback present in the next symbol set,
namely different segments of the symbol may be drawn at
different order and direction each time, resulting in high
variability within the user’s drawings.
– complex figures: These figures were constructed by fol-
lowing some principles: no dots or taps [29], [14], the
users finger must move in all directions while drawing
the symbol and the symbol should have many sharp turns
and angles [45]. These properties would potentially make
the resulting figures harder to mimic.
The final choice of the symbol set was based on the results
of our user study presented in Section VII.
response 0 1 2 3 4
easy words zero one two three four
complex words xman bmwz quak hurt fogy
easy figures
complex figures
TABLE II: Mapping of responses (d = 5) to symbols.
B. Choice of classifier
Our classifier is based on the dynamic time warping (DTW)
algorithm [28], [35]. We picked DTW because: (a) all the
chosen symbols naturally exhibit features that are a function of
time, (b) DTW is claimed to be the best performing distance
based classifier [18], and (c) DTW has been previously known
to perform well with a small number of training samples (5-10)
[39] (which is important to minimize registration time). Given
two time-series q1 and q2 of length τ1 and τ2, respectively, the
algorithm creates a τ1 × τ2 distance matrix where the (i, j)th
element is the (squared) Euclidean distance (q1(i) − q2(j))2,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ τ1, 1 ≤ j ≤ τ2. The output of the algorithm is
the warped path between the two time-series which minimizes
the sum of distances of its constituent cells (satisfying some
constraints such as starting at the bottom-left corner and
finishing at the top-right corner). See [35] for more details.
For our purposes, we assume that the output DTW(q1, q2) is
the sum of distances (without caring about the actual path).
We shall call this distance, the DTW distance between q1,
q2. Assume that there is a set Q of features, each of which
is a time-series. Let Qˆ represent the set of templates of the
features in Q. We shall describe how we obtain such templates
later. For now, assume that the template for each feature is
a single time series. Given a test sample of these features
(for authentication), also represented Q, the multi-dimensional
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DTW distance between Qˆ and Q is defined as [46]:
DTW(Qˆ,Q) =
|Q|∑
i=1
DTW(qˆi, qi).
We note that multi-dimensional DTW can also be defined by
extending the Euclidean distance from one-dimension to |Q|
dimensions and then computing the DTW distance [46]. How-
ever, our selected features originated from different sensors
of the device (e.g., touch event or gyroscope), which have
different sampling times and rates. We, therefore, chose the
definition above so that we do not have any alignment issues
and hence each dimension is treated independently.
C. Template Creation
The set of templates Qˆ is created as follows. For each user
U and for each symbol in Ω we obtain t sample renderings
of the symbol. These samples result in t time-series for each
feature. Fix a feature. We take one of the t time-series at a time,
compute its DTW distance with each of the t − 1 remaining
time-series, and sum the distances. The time-series that gives
the minimum cumulative sum is chosen as the optimal feature
template. The process is repeated for all features to create the
template Qˆ. Note that, this means that the optimal feature
templates in Qˆ may not belong to the same sample. We in
fact have two sets of optimal templates. The first template is
used to check if U produced a valid rendering of a symbol
from Ω. For this template, we only use the x, y coordinate
time series features (see Table III). We denote this template
by Qˆsym. The other template is used to check whether the
rendering itself comes from the target user U or some one
else. We shall simply denote this template by Qˆuser.
D. Classification Decision
Given a set of feature values Q from a sample, the
decision is made based on whether DTW(Qˆ,Q) lies below
a threshold. More specifically, the threshold is calculated as
~ .= µ+ zσ, where µ is the mean DTW distance between the
user’s optimal template Qˆ and all of the user’s t samples in the
registration phase [32]. Similarly σ is the standard deviation.
The parameter z ≥ 0 is a global parameter that is set according
to experimental data from a global set of users, and hence
remains the same for every user. The notation ~sym denotes
the threshold corresponding to Qˆsym, and ~user denotes the
threshold corresponding to Qˆuser. Our classification works as
follows.
– Step 1: If for a given challenge c = (a,w), x ∩ a 6= ∅
(i.e., the non-empty case), S first gets the target symbol
by computing f . Then, S computes the DTW distance
between Qˆsym and the sample. If the distance is greater
than ~sym then U is rejected. Otherwise, S moves to Step
2. On the other hand, if it is the empty case, S computes
the DTW distance between the incoming sample and Qˆsym
for each possible symbol. S assumes the symbol entered
by U is the one with the least distance. After establishing
the symbol, the distance is compared with ~sym for that
symbol, and server accordingly rejects or goes to Step 2.
– Step 2: In this step, the DTW distance between the sample
and Qˆuser of the symbol is computed. If the distance
is greater than ~user the user is rejected, otherwise it is
accepted.
E. Feature Identification
We identified three different categories of features: touch
features, stylometric features and device-interaction features.
Touch features correspond to how a user’s finger interacts with
the touch screen of the device. These include raw features
obtained through the device’s touch sensors as well as derived
features (such as velocity, acceleration, and force). Stylometric
features correspond to how a user renders a symbol on the
touch screen. For example, the area covered by the symbol,
and the angles between successive coordinate points in the
symbol. Stylometric features are constructed using the raw and
derived features from the touch sensor data. Finally, device-
interaction features originate from the way the user interacts
with the device through a medium other than the touch screen,
e.g., accelerometer and gyroscope.
We identify 19 types of local features by exploring the
literature [53], [14], [12], [48] and obtain a feature vector of
40 dimensions, as shown in Table III. Each feature is a set
of points arranged in time (time series) as the user renders a
symbol on the touch screen of the device. The features shown
in Table III are mostly self explanatory. For the mathematical
description of curvature, slope angle and path angle we refer
the reader to [48]. Since different features have different range
of values, we perform a standard z-score normalization on each
feature.
Figure 2 shows the feature x, i.e., the x-coordinate, as a
time series for the complex word “xman.” For ease of view, we
show the feature without normalization. Observe that the way
the word is written varies between different users (two samples
from User 1, User 2 and User 3), while remains similar for
the same user (User 1-A and 1-B).
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Time (ms)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
x
 c
oo
rd
in
at
e
User 1-A
User 1-B
User 2
User 3
Fig. 2: Feature comparison of samples from three users.
F. Feature Selection
In order to select the most distinguishing and non-
redundant features from the list of 40 features for each symbol,
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TABLE III: List of features.
# Touch feature Symbol # Stylometric feature Symbol # Device-interaction feature Symbol
1. Coordinates and change in coordinates x, y , δx, δy 8. Top, bottom, left, right most point TMP, BMP, LMP, RMP 15. Rotational position of device in space Rx, Ry, Rz
2. Velocity along coordinates x˙, y˙ 9. Width: RMP− LMP, Height: TMP− BMP width, height 16. Rate of rotation of device in space Gx, Gy, Gz
3. Acceleration along coordinates x¨, y¨ 10. Rectangular area: width× height area 17. 3D acceleration force due to device’s motion and gravity Ax, Ay, Az
4. Pressure and change in pressure p, δp 11. Width to height ratio WHR 18. 3D acceleration force solely due to gravity gx, gy, gz
5. Size and change in size s, δs 12. Slope angle θslope 19. 3D acceleration force solely due to device’s motion ax, ay, az
6. Force: p× s F 13. Path angle θpath
7. Action type: finger lifted up, down or on
touchscreen
AT 14. Curvature curve
we created our own variation of a wrapper method7 based
on sequential forward feature selection [37], [16]. This is
described in Algorithm 1. The algorithm is given as input
a total list of features Qtot and a symbol, and it outputs a
selected list of features Q for that symbol. The algorithm
starts with an empty list and iteratively adds one feature at
a time by keeping TPR = 1.0 and minimizing the FPR. The
TPR and FPR values are calculated based on user-adversary
pairs (see Section VI-A). The algorithm terminates when all
features in Qtot are exhausted. At the end, we are left with
multiple candidate subsets for Q (based on the number of
features included). We pick the one which has TPR = 1.0
and the least FPR as the final set of features. As we use a
wrapper-based approach, running the classifier is an inherent
part in feature selection. The algorithm therefore calls the Get
z-List algorithm (Algorithm 2) as a subroutine (based on a
similar procedure from [32]). This algorithm computes the z
values that give TPR of 1 and the least FPR for each possible
feature subset.
Algorithm 1: Select Features
input: Set of all features Qtot, a symbol ∈ Ω, a set of
user-attacker pairs (U ,A).
1 Initialize Q(0)sel ← ∅, i← 0.
2 for j = 1 to |Qtot| do
3 Set i← i+ 1.
4 Create temporary feature subsets Qj by adding feature
qj ∈ Qtot to Q(i−1)sel .
5 for each (U ,A) pair do
6 Run Get z-List algorithm (Algorithm 2) with inputs
Qj , U and A to get a z-list.
7 Sum TPR and FPR values for all users for each value of
0 ≤ z ≤ zmax in the z-list.
8 Let Qj be the temporary feature subset that has the minimum
FPR sum with TPR sum equal to 1.0.
9 Set Q(i)sel ← Q(i−1)sel ∪ {qj}, Qtot ← Qtot − {qj}.
10 Repeat Steps 2-9 until Qtot is empty.
11 Return Q .= Qsel from the Q
(i)
sel ’s that has the least FPR.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the BehavioCog scheme as an app for
Android based smartphones. We used a set of emojis, called
twemojis,8 as the global set of objects for the cognitive scheme.
The set consisted of n = 180 emojis. While the system is
tunable, we used the parameters (k, l, n) = (14, 30, 180) for
our user study (corresponding to the medium strength adver-
sary defined in Section III-H). Figure 3a shows an example
challenge. For the behavioural biometric scheme, we used the
7i.e., feature subset selection is based on classification results.
8Copyright 2016 Twitter, Inc and other contributors, https://github.com/
twitter/twemoji
Algorithm 2: Get z-List
input: Feature subset Q, registration and test samples from U ,
test samples from A.
1 For the features in Q, find the optimal template Qˆ together
with µ and σ from U’s registration samples.
2 Initialize an empty z-list.
3 Initialize z ← 0, step← 0.125, TP← 0, FP← 0.
4 while z ≤ zmax .= 10 do
5 Set ~← µ+ zσ
6 for each test sample from U do
7 if DTW distance between Qˆ and test sample is ≤ ~
then
8 TP← TP + 1.
9 for each test sample from A do
10 if DTW distance between Qˆ and test sample is ≤ ~
then
11 FP← FP + 1.
12 Compute TPR and FPR by normalizing the TP and FP
values.
13 Update z-list with the tuple (z,TPR, FPR).
14 Set z ← z + step.
15 Return z-list.
implementation of DTW from the FastDTW library [41] and
used a radius of 20. The radius controls how much the optimal
path can drift from the diagonal of the two dimensional matrix
representing the two time series to be aligned, and helps in
finding more accurate shortest paths between the two. Raw
touch features such as coordinates, pressure, size, and action
type are extracted using the standard Android API [1] from
the touch sensor of the device. The Android Motion Sensor
API [21] is used to extract the features for device-interaction
features. Our implementation handles any set of symbols used
for Ω. However, through our user study we found the set of
complex words to be best in terms of repeatability and hardness
of mimicking (see Section VII). Figure 3b shows an example
response entered by the user, using the complex word fogy.
Note that we use a dotted trace on the screen. Showing the full
trace makes it easier for an attacker to observe fine details of
a target user’s symbols, while showing no trace at all makes
it hard for the user since they cannot see what they already
drew or wrote. The dotted trace is a compromise.
Also note that we explicitly show the mapping of responses
to complex words. While this is fine, we were also interested
in knowing whether users could be trained to remember the
mapping. To do so, we created a few mnemonic helpers for
users to remember the mapping. These are shown in Table IV.
The mnemonic strategy used is a mixture of the (rhyming) peg
method, keyword method and picture-based mnemonics [43],
[10]. We reiterate that the map sym(r), for r ∈ Zd does not
need to be a secret, and therefore the user is not required to
remember the mapping as far as security is concerned.
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(a) challenge (b) response
Fig. 3: An example challenge and response in our implemen-
tation of BehavioCog.
r Mnemonic Word
0 hero xman is our hero
1 run bmwz runs on the street
2 the duck goes quak
3 I got hurt by a trident
4 can’t see four when it’s fogy
TABLE IV: Mnemonic mapping of cognitive response to
complex words.
Based on the example parameter sizes for the cognitive
scheme (Table I) and the results from the user study, we recom-
mend the parameters shown in Table V. The columns labelled
“Sessions” indicate whether the target is a medium-strength
or high-strength adversary A as discussed in Section III-H.
The acronym CW stands for complex words. Based on our
experiments, these words gave the best average FPR. The
security column shows the probability the A can succeed in
impersonating the user by randomly guessing the response and
mimicking the corresponding behavioural biometric symbol.
For complex words, the average FPR, denoted FPR was 0.05
(see Table VI). By setting pRG = 0.25 (approximately the
random guess probability for the cognitive scheme) and mul-
tiplying the two quantities we estimate the total impersonation
probability of A. For reference, the same probability for a 4-
digit PIN is 1× 10−4, and for a 6-digit PIN is 1× 10−6 (but
with no security under observation).
TABLE V: Example parameter sizes for BehavioCog.
(d, k, l, n) γ
Sessions Sessions
Ω Security(med. A) (high A)
(5, 5, 24, 60) 1 10 10 CW 1.3× 10−2
(5, 5, 24, 60) 2 5 5 CW 1.5× 10−4
(5, 5, 24, 60) 3 3 3 CW 2× 10−6
(5, 10, 30, 130) 1 24 24 CW 1.3× 10−2
(5, 10, 30, 130) 2 12 12 CW 1.5× 10−4
(5, 10, 30, 130) 3 8 8 CW 2× 10−6
(5, 14, 30, 180) 1 94 34 CW 1.3× 10−2
(5, 14, 30, 180) 2 47 17 CW 1.5× 10−4
(5, 14, 30, 180) 3 31 11 CW 2× 10−6
(5, 18, 30, 225) 1 511 168 CW 1.3× 10−2
(5, 18, 30, 225) 2 255 84 CW 1.5× 10−4
(5, 18, 30, 225) 3 170 56 CW 2× 10−6
VI. USER STUDY
In this section we give details of our user study. The
results from the study are shown in Section VII. An Android
based Nexus 5x smartphone was used in the experiments in a
controlled setting where the user sits on a chair and performs
the experiments. We got the ethics approval for our user study.
The total number of participants in the study was 41. Our
experiments were conducted in three phases. In the first phase,
we only collected touch biometric data from the users to select
the best features for each symbol in terms of repeatability and
hardness of mimicking using our feature selection algorithm,
and to determine which symbol set performs the best. In the
second phase, the complete hybrid authentication scheme was
tested to assess the usability and security of the scheme. In
the third phase, we performed extended cognitive training
and testing to check if more careful user training can reduce
cognitive errors present in Phase 2.
A. Phase 1
This phase involved collecting biometric samples from 22
(actual) participants: 8 females and 14 males for different
symbol sets. As some users agreed to provide biometric
samples for more than one symbol set, we ended up with 40
(logical) users. The 40 users were then divided equally into
four groups, one for each symbol set. The phase involved two
sessions. In the first session, the user was asked to render each
of the five symbols 13 times on the smartphone screen. The
first 10 were used to construct templates, and the last 3 were
reserved for testing. The whole session was video recorded.
The second session started a week after the first session.
Each user was asked to render all the symbols given to them
in the first session a further three times. These three samples
were then used to test the repeatability of symbols from the
same user. Each user was also asked to act as an attacker for a
particular target user and vice versa from the same group (same
symbol set). Thus, it was ensured that two participants from
the same group perform observation attacks against each other.
The (pretend) attacker watched a video of how a target user
writes a particular symbol. The attacker was given unrestricted
control to the playback of the video and was allowed to take
notes. The attacker was then asked to mimic the target user by
writing each symbol three times.
B. Phase 2
For Phase 2, we fixed the set of symbols to complex words
based on our results (described in Section VII). This phase
had a total of 30 (actual) participants, 11 of whom had also
participated in Phase 1. The 30 subjects included 11 females
and 19 males with 7 users in the age group 21-25, 8 users in the
age group 26-30, 13 in the age group 31-35 and 2 users over
the age of 40. This phase also consisted of two sessions. The
first session involved (cognitive and biometric) registration and
authentication. The biometric registration and authentication
were video recorded. The second session involved authentica-
tion, performing a random and video based observation attack
against a target user, and filling a questionnaire.
The 30 users were divided equally in three groups: Group
1, 2 and 3. The users in each group differed from other groups
in the amount of time they were allowed to do registration. In
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all the groups, user chose 14 emojis as their pass-emojis from
the pool of 180 emojis. For Group 1, we further asked the
users to write each of the five complex words three times to
create their templates. The registration for Group 2 included
an extended training game to help them recognize their pass-
emojis for better authentication accuracy and to help them
familiarize with BehavioCog. The training game was divided
into multiple steps in increasing order of difficulty, outlined
below.
1) The user was shown a fixed number of emojis with no
assigned weights. This was initially set to 5. The screen
contained at least one (random) pass-emoji and all others
were random decoys. The user was told exactly how many
of their pass-emojis were present and was asked to tap
on them. This process was repeated by increasing the
number of emojis shown from 5 to 25 in steps of 5 (with
a corresponding increase in the number of pass-emojis).
2) In order to aid the user in associating responses in Z5
to the corresponding words, mnemonic associations were
shown to the user as shown in Table IV. The user was then
given a series of easy questions with the correct answer
being the complex word to be entered. An example
question was: “0 rhymes with hero, who is our hero?
xman or batman?” There were three different questions
for each word, meaning the user wrote each word three
times.
3) This step was the same as Step 1 except that (a) the user
was not told how many of their pass-images were present,
and (b) the number of images was increased from 5 to
30 in steps of 5.
4) This step was the same as Step 3 except that (a) the
images also had weights in Z5, and (b) the user had to
compute f , map the response to the word and press one
of five buttons corresponding to the correct word.
5) This step was the same as Step 2 except that the questions
asked were slightly more difficult, e.g., “0 rhymes with
hero, is our hero.” The user had to write each
symbol two more times.
The users in Group 3 had the same registration process
as Group 2 but with the number of iterations increased.
Namely, 10 biometric samples of each word were collected
(five each from Steps 2 and 5). Also, the number of iterations
in Steps 1, 3, and 4 were twice more than those for Group
2. Immediately after registration, users from all groups were
asked to attempt authentication of the complete authentication
scheme. Each user was allowed 6 authentication attempts.
These were marked as authentication attempts of Session 1.
A same number of authentication attempts were repeated after
a gap of one week (but with no registration this time) for
Session 2. The users were given a couple of trial runs to get
a feel of how the system works before their attempts were
logged.
To simulate attacks, each (attacking) user was assigned
a target user. The attacker was asked to perform a random
attack and a video based observation attack, and then attempt
to impersonate the user three times each. In the random attack,
the attacker was asked to guess the cognitive response and
write the corresponding word on the touch screen. In the video
based observation attack, the attacker was allowed to watch
authentication attempts of the target user as many times as
they wanted. Afterwards, the attacker was asked to impersonate
the target user. To have more advantage in impersonation,
an attacker needs to watch as many correct authentication
attempts of the target user as possible. Hence, we picked those
users as target users who successfully authenticated at least 5
out of 6 times during Session 1.
During Session 2, we also asked the user to pick their 14
pass-emojis by showing them the whole pool of emojis. This
helps us to know how many emojis a user can recognize after
a week. We also asked the users to pick 14 pass-emojis, which
they believed belonged to their target (attacked) user. This
helps us to know how many emojis an attacker is able to guess
correctly for any target user. Finally, at the end of Session 2
users were asked to fill a questionnaire including a section to
fill their demographics: sex, age group and handedness. The
answers to the questions were scaled on a Likert 5 scale. The
questions in general asked the users about their perception
of the usability and security of the proposed authentication
scheme.
C. Phase 3
This phase was carried out as an after thought. We observed
a higher number of authentication errors in Session 2 as
compared to Session 1 in Phase 2 of the study (e.g., users
in Group 3 made 41% cognitive errors in Phase 2 versus 15%
in Phase 1; see Table IX.). These increased errors could either
be due to users’ failure to recognize pass-emojis after a gap
of one week or due to error in computing f . Consequently,
we decided to carry out a third phase of the user study
to find out the root cause and decrease the error rate. The
participants in this phase were only the users from Group
3, since they received the maximum amount of training and
were most familiar with the authentication scheme. Phase 3
again consisted of 2 sessions. In the first session, each user
was given an extended cognitive training immediately followed
by authentication attempts. Session 2 happened a week after
Session 1 and only involved authentication attempts. In the
extended cognitive training, each user was shown their 14 pass-
emojis one by one for 10 seconds followed by a 3 second
cool off period. This was grounded on previous research in
cognitive psychology which suggests that more exposure to
pictures and a brief cool off period helps to recognize pictures
better [49], [36], [40].
We hypothesize that cognitive errors in our scheme could
be due to three possible reasons: (a) the user confuses some of
the decoys as pass-emojis since only a subset of pass-emojis
are present in a challenge (l = 30), (b) the user makes errors in
computing f , and/or (c) the number of pass-emojis is high (14).
To pinpoint the reason, we asked the user to do the following
in order: (a) to identify if confusion arises in recognizing pass-
emojis during authentication, we asked the user to authenticate
six times into the system simply by selecting their pass-emojis
present in the challenge (with no weights); (b) to check if
performing arithmetic was the issue, we asked the user to
authenticate a further six times. This time the emojis had
weights and the user had to compute f and then press the
button corresponding to the correct response; (c) to find out
if the high number of pass-emojis was an issue, we asked the
user to selected their 14 pass-emojis from the total pool of 180
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and recorded their selection. Notice that this session did not
include any biometric study.
VII. RESULTS
A. Results from Phase 1
Recall that the goal of Phase 1 of the user study was
to decide which symbol set in Table II is the best in terms
of repeatability and mimicking hardness. We identified two
possible scenarios: best and worst case and select features
separately for the two scenarios. The two scenarios differ in the
way testing samples are chosen from the user and the attacker.
Note that we pair two users who were given the same symbol
set to act as an attacker on the other’s symbols. Hence we have
10 user-attacker (ordered) pairs for each symbol set.
– best case scenario: The first 10 biometric samples out
of 13 collected in Session 1 from a user are used for
training the classifier. The remaining three are used for
testing the accuracy of the classifier for the same user. The
attacker samples come from his/her last three samples of
the training data in Session 1.
– worst case scenario: The first 10 biometric samples out
of 13 collected in Session 1 are used for training the
classifier. The three samples from the same user for
testing the accuracy of the classifier come from Session
2 (which was a week apart). The three attacker samples
come from the samples entered after the video based
observation attack in Session 2.
Algorithm 1 was used to select features for each symbol
in the best and worst case scenarios. The selected feature
set is the one, which provides the least average FPR. A tie
in the average FPR is broken by choosing the feature set
corresponding to the smallest value of the threshold parameter
z. Essentially, features selected in the best case scenario are the
best in providing security against random attacks and ensuring
a minimal level of consistency between the user’s renderings
of the same symbol. The features selected in the worst case
scenario are best in terms of security against video based
observation attacks and ensuring consistency between user’s
renderings even when they are done after a gap in time.
Table VI shows the results (note that the TPR is one
in all cases). Complex words yield the least FPR in both
the best and worst case scenarios. The individual FPR for
complex words was: 0.0, 0.06, 0.0, 0.2, and 0.0 for xman,
bmwz, quak, hurt and fogy, respectively, in the worst case
scenario. Also, against random attacks, all symbol categories
have an almost 0% FPR. The table also shows the top features
in each symbol set. By top we mean those features that are
present in the selected feature set of at least two or more
symbols in the symbol set. Simple features such as coordinates,
change in coordinates and stylometric features such as height,
area, angles and margins constitute the features that provide
repeatability and hardness of mimicking across all symbol sets.
We do not have enough evidence to conclude whether device-
interaction features (see Table III) are useful in our case.
To dig deeper into why some symbol sets have poorer
average FPR than others in the worst case scenario, we did
the following for each symbol: First, we fix z = 1, pick
best features for each symbol through the feature selection
algorithm and pick first 10 biometric training samples from
Session 1 to train the classifier for each user. Next, we tested
the classifier, (a) using user’s own last three samples from
Session 1 to obtain TPR values, (b) using user’s three samples
from Session 2 to obtain TPR values, and (c) using attacker’s
three samples from Session 2 to obtain FPR values. The results
are shown in Table VII. The average TPR for all users for
Session 1 is denoted TPR1, whereas for Session 2 is denoted
TPR2. We can see that the average TPR for Session 2 decreases
from Session 1 for complex figures drastically which means
that users find it hard to repeat drawings of complex figures. A
near consistent average TPR but a high average FPR between
the two sessions for easy words and easy figures means they
are repeatable but not secure against video based observation
attacks. The reason for easy words to be easily mimicked is
because of the presence of letters, which do not contain many
sharp turns such as o, c and s. The easy figures were easily
attacked because drawing them does come naturally to the
users and hence they draw them slowly, which makes it easy
for an attacker to pick and then mimic. The results for complex
words show that they are both highly repeatable and cannot be
easily mimicked. Users can write words fluently (due to years
of practice), thereby making them difficult to be mimicked.
B. Results from Phase 2
Recall that the goal of Phase 2 of the user study was to test
our complete authentication scheme. We discuss these results
in the following.
1) Registration Time: Table VIII shows the time taken by
different user groups in completing the training. The average
time to select 14 pass-images is around 2 minutes for all
groups. The maximum training time is around 12 minutes for
Group 3, since it had the most amount of training. Users in
both Group 2 and Group 3 spend 50% of their total training
time for the cognitive scheme to familiarize themselves with
their pass-emojis and also learning how to use the scheme. The
time to collect biometric samples takes 50%, 30%, and 37%
of the total training time for Group 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Since registration is one-off we do not consider the amount of
time taken as a major hurdle, specially when most of the users
reported enjoying the registration phase as it had a game-like
feel to it (see Section VII-B10).
2) Authentication Time: Table IX shows the average au-
thentication time (per round) taken by different user groups
in the two sessions. Since we were interested in per round
statistics, we allow the server to accept or reject after each
round. Cognitive time represents the time taken by the user to
recognize their pass-images and compute f . The time spent on
writing the complex words on the touchscreen corresponding
to the response is the biometric time. The time between the
user’s submission of the biometric response and the server’s
accept/reject message is the processing time. Generally, the
user spends 15-20 seconds in computing f and 6-8 seconds in
entering the biometric response. The results show that more
training helps the users to recognize their pass-emojis quicker
since Group 3 has the least login time among all the three user
groups in Session 1. We also see that the average total time
for authentication does not change drastically between the two
sessions.
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TABLE VI: Results for best and worst case scenarios for different symbol sets.
Symbol set Average FPR (best case) Average FPR (worst case) Top features (best case) Top features (worst case)
easy words 0.01 0.24 x, y, δx, δy, TMP, θslope, θpath, Rx TMP, height, WHR, θslope, θpath
complex words 0.00 0.05 y, δy, p, height, area, θslope, Ry δx, height, θpath
easy figures 0.01 0.38 y, δx, δy, p, F, height, area, θslope, θpath y, δy, p, height
complex figures 0.01 0.39 δx x, TMP, BMP
TABLE VII: Results indicating repeatability and resilience
against observation attacks for different symbol sets.
Symbol Category TPR1 (average) TPR2 (average) Average FPR
easy words 0.93 1.00 0.24
complex words 0.91 1.00 0.05
easy figures 0.68 0.60 0.21
complex figures 0.70 0.53 0.39
TABLE VIII: Average registration time (in seconds) of differ-
ent user groups in Phase 2.
Group Pass-emojis Cognitive Biometric Totalselection time training time training time training time
1 128 0 129 257
2 114 284 174 573
3 105 359 282 746
3) Authentication Errors: Table IX also shows the per-
centage of successful authentication attempts along with the
cognitive and biometric errors. Recall that each user attempted
six authentications in each session. So, we have a total of
v = 60 authentication attempts for each user group in each
session. If the users were randomly submitting a cognitive
response, the probability that i out of the v cognitive attempts
would succeed is given by
p
.
=
(
v
i
)
piRG(1− pRG)v−i.
We will consider i ≥ 20 out of the 60 attempts (< 66% error
rate) as statistically significant because then we have p < 0.05.
This would imply that the users were not successfully passing a
cognitive challenge just due to luck. By looking at the table, we
see that all groups had cognitive error rates far less than this.
We also see that cognitive training aids the user’s short term
memory. Users from Group 3 could authenticate successfully
85% of the time (9 out of the 10 users could authenticate
5 or more times). Users in Group 1 who did not have any
cognitive training successfully authenticated only 36% of the
time. Group 2 users, who received a shorter cognitive training
than Group 3, accrue 18% cognitive errors, similar to the
cognitive errors from Group 3. However, as the number of
biometric training samples collected for users in Group 2 is 5
as opposed to 10 from Group 3, most failures originate from
biometric errors. Hence, we believe that if the same number
of biometric training samples were collected from users in
Group 2 as in Group 3, the performance would be similar
to the latter group. In other words, cognitive training time
could be reduced. We see a drastic decrease in the successful
authentication attempts in Session 2 from Session 1 especially
for Group 3 (from 85% to 50%) and Group 2 (from 50%
to 24%). Cognitive errors are predominantly responsible for
the drastic decrease as they caused more than half of the
authentication attempts to fail for Group 2 and 3, and 40% for
Group 1. To find out the actual cause for such a high number
of cognitive errors, we did Phase 3 of the study, whose results
are described in Section VII-C.
4) Attack Statistics: We picked those 12 users to be at-
tacked who successfully authenticated 5 out of 6 times in
Session 1 from all the 30 users. Nine users belong to Group
3; two users belong to Group 2 and one user belong to Group
1. Each user among the 30 users in the three groups attacks
only one of the 12 target users and performs three random and
three video based observation attacks. Hence the total number
of random and video based observation attacks is 90 each. If
we denote the average FPR of our system by FPR then the
probability of a random attack can be estimated as
ptot = pRG × FPR ≈ 0.256× 0.05 ≈ 0.013.
Thus i out of v = 90 correct guesses would be binomially
distributed as
p
.
=
(
v
i
)
pitot(1− ptot)v−i.
Thus we will consider an i ≥ 4 as statistically significant since
then p < 0.05. The percentage of successful attacks in our
study was 3.33% (3 times) for both random and video based
observation attacks (which is not statistically significant), and
none of the successful attacks were consecutive. In all six
cases, we found that the target user writes the words using
block letters and not cursively. This makes it easier for an
attacker to mimic the user [9].
5) Distribution of Symbols in the Empty Case: In the empty
case, the user is supposed to write a random complex word. We
are interested in finding if the resultant distribution of symbols
is random or not. We had a total of v = 34 instances of the
empty case. The probability of randomly choosing a word is
1
d =
1
5 . The number of times, i, a word was written in a
total of v empty cases, is once again binomially distributed
(conditioned on the null hypothesis) with this probability. We
will consider i ≤ 3 and i ≥ 11 as statistically significant
(as they imply p < 0.05). We found that the word xman
(corresponding to r = 0) was significantly overused (i = 13),
whereas the word bmwz (mapped to r = 1) was significantly
less used (i = 2). The frequency of occurrence of other
words did not deviate (statistically) significantly. We believe
the reason for overuse of xman might be because the user
thought that an empty case implies the cognitive response is
0. Note that the users were told that they need to write any
word in the empty case.
6) Effect of Number of Pass-Emojis Present: From Table X
we see that the percentage of cognitive errors and authenti-
cation time steadily increases with an increasing number of
pass-emojis present in the challenge, which is what we would
expect. Surprisingly, the time taken in the empty case is more
than the time taken when one or more pass-emojis is present.
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TABLE IX: Authentication statistics for different user groups.
Group & session Av. cognitive Av. biometric Av. processing Av. total Success Cognitive Biometrictime (sec) time (sec) time (sec) time (sec) rate (%) errors (%) errors (%)
Group 1 - Session 1 (Phase 2) 18.3 7.9 0.7 27.0 38.3 31.6 31.0
Group 2 - Session 1 (Phase 2) 19.8 6.4 0.7 27.0 50.0 18.3 36.0
Group 3 - Session 1 (Phase 2) 12.2 5.6 0.8 18.7 85.0 15.0 0.0
Group 1 - Session 2 (Phase 2) 18.5 7.5 0.7 26.8 26.6 55.0 18.3
Group 2 - Session 2 (Phase 2) 18.4 6.4 0.7 25.6 23.3 55.0 26.6
Group 3 - Session 2 (Phase 2) 15.8 5.4 0.9 22.0 50.0 41.6 8.3
Group 3 - Session 1 (Phase 3) - - - - 94.0 6.0 -
Group 3 - Session 2 (Phase 3) - - - - 86.0 14.0 -
A likely reason for this is that the user needs more time to
ensure if it is indeed the empty case.
TABLE X: Time taken and percentage of cognitive errors a
function of number of pass-emojis present in a challenge.
# of pass-emojis Frequency Average time (sec) Cognitive errors (%)
0 34 18.08 0.00
1 83 14.63 36.14
2 111 17.52 42.34
3 67 16.90 44.77
4 40 18.30 50.00
5 21 22.60 52.38
6 4 16.22 25.00
7) Pass-Emojis Chosen by Users: The probability that an
emoji is present in a random sample of k emojis out of n is
k
n . Thus in v random samples, the probability that an emoji
occurs i times is given by
p
.
=
(
v
i
)(
k
n
)i(
1− k
n
)v−i
.
We had 30 users in Phase 2. Thus, setting v = 30 in the above,
we see that if an emoji occurs i ≥ 6 times in the 30 chosen
pass-emojis, we will consider the event statistically significant
(p < 0.05).9 Our results show that 15 emojis were selected by
at least six or more users. These are shown in Table XI along
with the number of users who chose them. Ten of the 15 emojis
are animals, which seems to indicate that users were choosing
their pass-emojis using an animal theme. This is perhaps also
due to the fact that animals constituted a high percentage of
the total emojis.
Frequency Emojis
9
8
7
6
TABLE XI: The 15 most popular emojis in users’ pass-emojis.
8) Recognizing Pass-Emojis: The minimum, maximum and
average number of pass-emojis recognized was, respectively,
(7, 12, 9.0) for Group 1, (8, 13, 10.5) for Group 2 and (10, 14,
12.1) for Group 3. These results were obtained by asking the
users to select their pass-emojis from the total pool of emojis
after a gap of one week. If the user does not remember any
9For the lower tail, we see that the probability is always higher than 0.05
since v is small.
of the pass-emojis, the probability of correctly selecting i out
of k emojis is given by
p
.
=
(
k
i
)(
n−k
k−i
)(
n
k
) .
An i ≥ 4 is significant (since p < 0.05). We can see that
all groups were able to remember a significant number of
their pass-emojis. The results indicate that more training may
help users in recognizing their pass-emojis in the longer term.
However, the higher recognition rates for both Groups 2 and 3
do not translate into higher successful authentication attempts
in Session 2. We look into more details of why this happens
in the results for Phase 3. We can also conclude from this that
without much training, users may easily recognize around up
to 7 emojis even after a gap in time. Recognizing 10 or more
emojis in the longer term requires more training.
9) Guessing Pass-Emojis: From the analysis above, we see
that if an attacker can guess more than 4 pass-emojis of the
target user, we will consider that the attacker has significant
advantage over random guess. We found that five of the 30
attackers were able to guess 4 or more pass-emojis of the target
user, and one attacker guessed as many as 11. In the last case,
the attacker thought that the target user might have picked
pass-emojis according to a theme comprising of animals. This
result shows that picking pass-emojis based on a theme might
lead to more chances of being attacked.
10) Questionnaire Statistics: At the end of Session 2, we
asked the (30) users to fill a questionnaire on a Likert scale of
1 to 5, where 1 means Strongly disagree, 2 means Disagree, 3
means Neither Agree or Disagree, 4 means Agree and 5 means
Strongly Agree. The general consensus about the ease of
writing words on the smartphone screen was a rating of 4. The
users liked playing the training game during the registration
with an overall rating of 4. The overall usability of the scheme
received mixed rating from the users (3). However, the users
who mostly rated 1 or 2 for usability said that they are likely
to use the system if it can provide a high security guarantees.
The major issue the users had with our scheme is the number
of pass-emojis. The rating was 2 when the users were asked
if they could manage 14 pass-emojis easily. A 53% of the
users say that they would not like to use the system because
of 14 pass-emojis, and 30% users found it hard to recognize
their pass-emojis during authentication. Only 16% and 6% of
the users complained about entering biometric responses and
computing f .
Most users (53%) prefer 6-10 pass-emojis as their secret
followed by 30% who prefer no more than 5 pass-emojis. In
response to the question on the size of l (i.e., the window
14
size), 53% of the users responded with 0-10 emojis. 23% users
said 11-20 and a similar percentage were fine with the current
scheme (21-30 emojis). When asked how they picked their
pass-emojis, 18 users said they created a certain theme to make
it easy for them to remember their pass-emojis. Some users
used multiple themes; 7 users said that they picked animals, 6
users picked food items, 2 users picked tools, 2 users picked
sports, one picked recreation and one picked faces. Two users
created a theme based on a story. One story was: “Santa
watching sports while eating a lot of food.”
C. Results from Phase 3
Recall that this phase was carried out to find the main cause
of cognitive errors and to improve our training to alleviate
the issue. The users did 12 authentication attempts each in
Sessions 1 and 2. The first 6 involved merely selecting the
pass-emojis present whereas the second involved computing
f as well. The results are shown in the last two rows of
Table IX. The results show that our improved training module
(more exposure to each individual pass-emojis followed by
blank screens) drastically decreases the error rate. Even after a
week’s gap the success rate is 86%. We rule out the possibility
that high number of pass-emojis is the most probable reason
for high cognitive errors because the minimum, maximum
and average number of pass-emojis users can recognized was,
(12, 14, 13.6) for Session 1 and (11, 14, 13.5) for Session
2 respectively. In fact, seven out of 10 users can recognize
all of their pass-emojis in both the sessions. We also counted
the total number of errors made by the users in the first 6
authentication attempts, which turned up 13, and the last 6
authentication attempts, which turned up 11, adding results
from both sessions. This shows no evidence that computing f
was causing errors. We, therefore, believe that the main cause
of errors is due to the user confusing decoy emojis as his pass-
emojis since only a subset of the k emojis are present in the
challenge (due to l).
VIII. RELATED WORK
Although our idea is generic enough to use any cog-
nitive authentication scheme, we proposed a new scheme
since existing schemes did not possess all the attributes we
desired. The low complexity cognitive authentication scheme
(CAS) proposed by Weinshall [52] could have been a natural
candidate. Unfortunately, it is susceptible to SAT solver based
attacks shown by Wagner and Golle [20]. Although they
reported that their attack could find the secret after observing
60 rounds, it may be possible to further reduce this with a trade
off with time complexity. Furthermore, the CAS scheme uses
parameter sizes of n = 80 and k = 30, and all n images need
to be shown on the screen at once, which is hard to display
on touch screens of smartphones. The Asghar, Pieprzyk and
Wang (APW) scheme [6] suffers from the same issue where
all n images need to be displayed. The scheme from Li and
Teng [33] requires the user to remember three different secrets
and perform lexical-first matching on the challenge to obtain
hidden sub-sequences. The cognitive load of their scheme
seems high, and it is unclear if a graphical implementation
is possible. The HB protocol from [23] is another candidate
which can be modified to use window based challenges, but it
requires the user to add random responses with a probability
η < 12 . It is unclear how the user could mentally generate
a skewed probability η. The Foxtail protocol from Li and
Shum [31] reduces the response space to {0, 1} which means
that more number of rounds would be needed. Schemes such as
predicate-based authentication service (PAS) [7] only resist a
very small number of authentication sessions (< 10) [30]. The
convex hull click (CHC) scheme uses a somewhat different
approach, in which the response could be any point on the
screen. The user locates at least three of his/her pass-images
in the challenge and clicks randomly within the imaginary
convex hull of the pass-images. With the default parameter
sizes k = 5 and l = 82 (on average) the scheme is vulnerable
to statistical attacks [54], [4]. Setting aside the issue of how
the response space from CHC can be matched to behavioural
biometrics, it appears that increasing parameter sizes (to make
the scheme more secure) will require higher number of rounds
to resist random guesses. Blum and Vempala [11] propose
several simple cognitive schemes which are easy to compute
for humans and require little training. Although their schemes
are information theoretically secure, the guarantee is only for
a small number of observed sessions (6 to 10). The scheme
from Blocki et al [10] is provably secure against statistical
adversaries, and can resist a sizeable number of observed
sessions. The scheme’s main drawback is the extensive training
which requires a human user to memorize random mappings
from 30-100 images to digits, which, even with memory
aids such as mnemonics, could take considerable time. An
interesting open question is to see if their proof strategy can
be extended to show if BehavioCog is secure against statistical
adversaries.
A number of touch-based behavioural biometric schemes
have been proposed for user authentication [53], [19], [29],
[44]. Most of these schemes rely on simple gestures on
smartphones such as swipes. We have argued that if we were
to use simple gestures then a much larger number of them
need to be accumulated to get good accuracy. Also, swipes
are prone to observation attacks [27]. The work of Sherman
et al. [45] does indeed include more complex (free-form)
gestures and partly inspired our symbol set of complex figures.
However, their gestures are only known to resist shoulder-
surfing attacks and not video based observation attacks where
the attacker has full control over the playback. The closest
work similar to ours is by Toan et. al. [39]. Their scheme
authenticates users on the basis of how they write their PINs
on the smartphone touch screen using x, y coordinates. In
comparison, we do a more detailed feature selection process
to identify features, which are repeatable and resilient against
observation attacks. Furthermore, they report an equal error
rate (EER) of 6.7% and 9.9% against random and shoulder-
surfing attacks, respectively. Since these are EER values, the
TPR is much lower than 1.0. To obtain a TPR close to
1.0, the FPR will need to be considerably increased. Thus,
after observing one session, the observer has a non-negligible
chance of getting in (since the PIN is no longer a secret).
To achieve a low probability of random guess, the number of
rounds in their scheme would need to be higher. Furthermore,
after obtaining the PIN, the attacker may adaptively learn target
user’s writing by querying the authentication service. The use
of a cognitive scheme, as mentioned before, removes this
drawback. Another work close to ours is KinWrite [48], which
asks the user to write their passwords in 3D space, and then
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authenticates them based on their writing patterns in 3D space.
We note that KinWrite also suffers from the same drawbacks
mentioned before. Pure graphical password schemes such as
De´Ja` Vu [17] and Draw-a-Secret scheme [24] where the user
has to click directly on pass-images or reproduce the same
drawing on the screen, have the same vulnerability. A single
observation reveals the secret, and if a behavioural biometric
component is added, it is as good as using it as a standalone
system.
IX. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
To begin, our initial user study showed that a large number
of pass-emojis is hard to recognize, especially when the
protocol uses a window based challenge (a random subset of
total objects). This was most likely due to users confusing
emojis similar to their pass-emojis as their own (e.g., having
similar color) since not all pass-emojis are present to clear
the confusion and/or the exact number of pass-emojis present
is unknown. Unfortunately, fixing the number of pass-emojis
in a challenge is not an answer as this makes the scheme
susceptible to statistical attacks as discussed in Section III-D.
We have shown that a carefully designed training module based
on results from cognitive psychology helped users recognize
their pass-emojis better. The potential of this needs to be
further explored to see how large a set of images could
be successfully recognized by users after longer gaps. We
reiterate that our scheme also allows a smaller number of pass-
emojis but at the expense of withstanding a smaller number
of observed authentication sessions. This is not a serious
drawback for authentication on smartphones, as it may be
impractical for an attacker to follow a mobile user over a
sustained period to record enough observations.
Turning to behavioural biometrics, we observe a slight
increase in biometric errors (Group 3 in Table IX) after a one
week period. A remedy is to frequently update the biometric
template by replacing older samples with samples from suc-
cessful authentication attempts [14]. In general, behavioural
biometrics tends to evolve over time. On the flip side this
very disadvantage is desirable from a privacy perspective. Once
stolen, physiological biometrics such as fingerprints cannot be
replaced. If the template of a word is stolen, the situation
is less dire; the user behaviour might evolve over time or
the word itself could be replaced. This is one reason for
our preference of behavioural biometrics. Changing topic,
the skeptic may object to our claim that our scheme resists
observations, because while the cognitive scheme can in theory
be proven to resist observation attacks, a similar claim for
the behavioural biometric scheme has only been empirically
demonstrated through our user study. We somewhat agree;
although the evidence provided by us points to the plausibility
of our claim, the exact difficulty in mimicking cursively written
words derived from certain English letters (see Section IV-A)
needs to be further explored.
Looking at Table IX, our cognitive scheme might be
susceptible to timing attacks [51], in which the attacker can
guess how many pass-emojis are present based on the time
the user takes to reply to a challenge. One way to circumvent
this is to not allow the user to proceed unless a fixed amount
of time has elapsed based on the highest average-time taken
per number of pass-emojis present. We also did not consider
an adversary that intercepts biometric samples en route from
the smartphone to the authentication service S. An obvious
solution is to use an encrypted channel. A final remark is that
in order to protect the user’s secret (pass-emojis and biometric
templates), the authentication service could keep it encrypted
and decrypt it only briefly during authentication. To ensure
that the protocol can be carried out without ever decrypting the
secret requires further research into application of techniques
such as fuzzy vaults [25] and functional encryption [13]. For
now, we leave it as future work.
X. CONCLUSION
The promise offered by cognitive authentication schemes
that they are resistant to observation has failed to crystallize
in the form of a workable protocol. Indeed, many researchers
have come to the conclusion that such schemes may never be
practical. We do not refute this, but instead argue that com-
bining cognitive schemes with other authentication schemes
may make the hybrid scheme practical and still resistant to
observation, albeit in a more empirical sense. Our approach
was to seek help from touch-based behavioural biometric
authentication. We demonstrate considerable gain in usability
over standalone cognitive schemes, but concede that several
aspects need to be improved in future. Our proposed cognitive
and behavioural biometric schemes are not the only ones
possible. In fact, we need not confine ourselves to touch
based biometrics, and may explore other behavioural biometric
modalities. This way, several different constructions are con-
ceivable.
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